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Abstract
In the following paper we propose a model-theoretical way of com-
paring the ”strength” of various truth theories which are conservative
over PA. Let Th denote the class of models of PA which admit an
expansion to a model of theory Th. We show (combining some well
known results and original ideas) that
PA ⊃ TB ⊃ RS ⊃ UTB ⊇ CT−,
wherePA denotes simply the class of all models of PA and RS denotes
the class of recursively saturated models of PA. Our main original
result is that every model of PA which admits an expansion to a model
of CT−, admits also an expanion to a model of UTB. Moreover, as a
corollary to one of the results we conclude that UTB is not relatively
interpretable in TB, thus answering the question from [4].
1 Introduction
Our paper concerns models of weak theories of truth. By a ”theory of truth”
we mean an extension of Peano Arithmetic (henceforth denoted by PA) with
axioms for an additional unary predicate T (x) with intended reading ”x is
(a Go¨del code of) a true sentence”. We call a theory of truth ”weak” iff
it is a conservative extension of PA. Theories of truth are of interest both
because of the philosophical context in which they emerged and of insights
into the structure of models of PA which they provide us with. Let us briefly
comment on both these issues.
Truth theories constitute a well established area of research in contempo-
rary epistemology and logic (for a comprehensive introduction and reference
see [6]). In particular weak theories of truth have been introduced as a co-
herent formal framework for an explication of some stances in the debate
over the metaphysical status of the notion of truth, specifically so called
deflationary theories of truth. The deflationists claim that:
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1. Sentences of the form ”φ is true” do not ascribe any actual property
to the sentence φ,
2. The meaning of truth predicate is completely analysable in terms of
Tarski’s disquotation scheme.
The first claim is contemporarily explicated by some authors (see [16],
[3]) in terms of conservativity of a theory of truth over a theory of syntax (the
latter usually modelled as PA). Namely: the claim that the predicate ”φ is
true” does not express any actual property is rearticulated as a thesis that
the correct theory of truth should be conservative over PA. This is precisely
where the interest in weak theories of truth as defined in the following article
comes from.
The second claim is usually explicated as a thesis that the notion of truth
is axiomatizable by Tarski’s scheme (i.e. axioms of the form Tpφq ≡ φ,
where φ is a formula) or, more precisely, some syntactic restriction thereof
(e.g. Tarski’s scheme restricted to arithmetical sentences; for a detailed
discussion of this explication of the deflationary theory of truth see [11], for
a discussion of both theses see again [6]). Formal theories of truth satisfying
both above conditions such as TB and UTB, defined later on in this paper,
are subject to investigation as deflationary theories par excellence.
Our research in the structure of models of weak theories of truth is related
to another possible interpretation of the first claim of the deflationary theory
of truth. This explication claims that the correct theory of truth should be
model-theoretically conservative over PA, i.e. every model M of PA should
admit an expansion to a model (M,T ) of the deflationary theory of truth.
Speaking a bit na¨ıvely, if ”φ is true” really doesn’t express any genuine
property, then its admissibility should not impose any conditions on how the
object domain looks like, which can in turn be directly explicated as a model-
theoretic conservativeness of the theory of truth. A very similar argument
for the syntactic conservativeness interpretation of the deflationary theory
of truth has been presented in [16].
As of this moment, we are highly sceptical towards the adequacy of this
explication in the debate on deflationism. Even if it is the case that some
weak theory of truth is not model-theoretic conservative over PA, this is
not a substantial objection to a deflationist, who might be sceptical exactly
whether Tarskian semantics provides a correct analysis of the relationship
between the actual language and its object domain. It might happen how-
ever, that in course of the philosophical debate new arguments emerge for
this stronger notion of conservativeness as an adequate explication.
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Model theoretic considerations might be also seen as a tool for fine-
grained classification of the weak theories of truth whose strength cannot be
measured by merely proof-theoretical considerations, since most important
ones, UTB and CT−, are incomparable. Namely: Th1 could be deemed
not stronger than Th2 if all models of PA that admit an expansion to Th2,
admit also an expansion to Th1. In the following paper we actually prove
that for the three most important weak theories of truth, i.e. TB, UTB and
CT− the classes of models of PA that admit an extension to the models of
respective truth theory can be linearly ordered by inclusion. I.e our result
is that:
PA ⊃ TB ⊃ RS ⊃ UTB ⊇ CT− (∗)
where PA denotes simply the class of all models of PA, RS denotes the class
of recursively saturated models of PA and by TB,UTB,CT− we mean the
class of models of PA which admit an extension to a model of TB,UTB,CT−
respectively. Note that ⊃ means ”strict inclusion”. Note that we do not
assume that models of PA we deal with are countable, which would make
the right part of the above sequence trivially collapse, due to Barwise-Schlipf
theorem (i.e. Fact 2.9 in this paper).
Seen from the purely model-theoretical perspective weak theories of truth
are handy tool for obtaining interesting results about the structure of models
of PA. Most striking examples of their implementation include: easy proof
of Smorynski–Stavi theorem, proof in ZFC of the existence of recursively
saturated rather classless models of PA (both due to Schmerl, see [15]) and
the result that countable recursively saturated models of PA have recursively
saturated end extensions. Although all these proofs had been established
independently, weak theories of truth provided conceptual and uniform way
of dealing with those complicated structures.
1.1 A Short Commentary on the Main Result
Let us have a word of comment on the main result. We proved that every
model of PA which admits an expansion to a model of CT−, admits also
an expansion to UTB. Note that this is a strengthening of Stuart Smith’s
result given in [17] as we show that the undefinable class proven to exist by
Smith can be fully inductive. Moreover one can deduce Lachlan’s theorem
(”models of CT− are recursively saturated”) from it since an easy argument
from overspill demonstrates that models of UTB are recursively saturated.
When one restricts attention to countable models of PA then our result
is an easy consequence of classical results in the model theory for PA. What
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is more, a stronger theorem is true: both theories have exactly the same
countable models, and these are precisely recursively saturated ones. Let
us sketch the argument: by Lachlan theorem (see [10]) every model of CT−
is recursively saturated and by Kotlarski-Krajewski-Lachlan Theorem ([10])
every such model carries an interpretation of CT−1. This ends the argument
for CT−. To prove that each countable recursively saturated model of PA
carries an interpretation of UTB truth class one uses resplendency of count-
able and recursively saturated models and proof-theoretical conservativity
of UTB over PA, which is a folklore result (which can be found in [6]). The
converse direction uses induction for the truth predicate in a straightforward
way, and we give a proof of it in Section 3 (Proposition 3.2).
In the general case things get much more complicated as many intriguing
models emerge. First observation is that in a sense there are strictly more
recursively saturated models than models which admit an interpretation of
CT− or UTB. This is a consequence of the fact that rather classles models
of PA can be recursively saturated (as stated in Theorem 3.10 proved by
Kauffman) and the fact that models of CT− and UTB always carry an
undefinable class (for CT−this is the content of Stuart Smith’s theorem
given in [17]2. For UTB this trivially follows by Tarski’s theorem, as the
interpretation of UTB-truth predicate, being fully inductive, is always a
class.) Both results are highly non-trivial. It is worth emphasizing that
rather classles models of PA cannot separate UTB from CT−, hence one
needs different tools to find a structure (if it can be found) which admits an
interpretation of the latter but not the former theory. Our main result shows
that as far as the inclusion CT− ⊆ UTB is concerned things behave like in
the countable case, but this requires substantially different arguments.
1.2 Structure of the paper
In the Section 2 we introduce all the notions, both from truth theory and
model theory of PA, necessary to understand our results. In the next section
(i.e. Section 3) we give construction of a model of TB which cannot be
extended to a model of UTB, which is our original result. In the rest of this
section we prove some well-known results which are needed to have our tower
of inclusions (depicted in (∗)) completed. We devote Section 4 to the proof
1One can give independent proof of this fact using resplendency of countable recursively
saturated models (which is the content of Barwise-Schlipf-Ressayre Theorem (2.9)) and
conservativity of CT− proved independently by Enayat-Visser (in [2]) and Leigh (in [13])
2Note that this result also becomes trivial when restricted to countable case
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of our main theorem. This is the most technical and definitely the most
difficult part of our paper. In the appendix, for the sake of completeness, we
give Schmerl’s construction of rather classles, recursively saturated model
of PA.
2 Notation and definitions
In this section we would like to introduce key definitions along with some
notation. As for the latter we make a number of simplifications which strictly
speaking might be ambiguous but no reasonable reading may cause any
confusion. Considerations of fairly logical nature might be easily obscured
by inappropriately heavy coding and putting too much stress on this aspect,
which we tried to avoid.
Convention 2.1. 1. PA denotes Peano Arithmetic, and LPA is the lan-
guage in which it is formalized (for the sake of definiteness we assume
that LPA = {·,+,≤, 0, 1, S} where S is a one argument function and
·, + are two argument functions).
2. We use big capital letters M , N . . . for models of PA even if not stated
explicitly.
3. We use Form(x), Sent(x), Term(x), ClTerm(x) to denote formulae
representing in PA sets of (Go¨del codes of) respectively (arithmetical)
formulae, sentences, terms and closed terms. If M is a model of PA,
then by Form(M) we mean the set of (the codes of) arithmetical for-
mulae in this model. Similarly for Sent,Term and ClTerm. We use x
to denote the x-th numeral, i.e. the closed term of the form S . . . S(0),
where the successor symbol S has been repeated x times.
4. We skip Quine’s corners when talking about Go¨del codes of syntactic
objects, e.g. we write
Φ(ψ)
instead of Φ(pψq).
5. We will implicitly assume that, when bounded by a quantifier, vari-
ables s, t, . . . refer to (Go¨del codes of) terms and φ,ψ, . . . refer to (Go¨del
codes of) formulae. In particular we write
∀t φ(t)
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instead of
∀x(ClTerm(x) −→ φ(x)),
and we treat
∀ψ Φ(ψ)
in the same fashion. Analogously for the existential quantifier.
6. We write t◦ to denote the result of formally evaluating the (Go¨del code
of) term t. If t¯ = (t1, . . . , tn) is a tuple of terms of a fixed length, then
t¯◦ = (t◦1, . . . , t
◦
n).
7. We sometimes write the result of syntactical operations with no men-
tion of the operations themselves e.g.
∃t Ψ(φ(t))
stands for
∃t Ψ(Subst(φ, t))
where Subst(x, y) is a formula representing substitution function. In
a similar fashion
Ξ(φ ∧ ψ)
stands for
∀θ
(
θ = Conj(φ,ψ)→ Ξ(θ)
)
.
where Conj(x, y) stands for the formula representing function which
takes two (Go¨del codes of) formulae to (the Go¨del code of) their con-
junction.
8. If P (x) is any predicate, then we denote the language LPA ∪ {P} by
LPAP.
9. If P (x) is any predicate then by Ind(P ) we mean the set of all instan-
tiations of induction scheme for all formulae in the language LPAP. If
φ is any formula then by Ind(φ) we mean the induction axiom for the
formula φ.
We shall now introduce the theories which will be considered in this
paper. They have been all extensively discussed in [6].
Definition 2.2. All the theories are formalised in the language LPAT and
are extensions of PA (below we list only the additional axioms).
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1. TB− is a theory axiomatized by the scheme (called Tarski Bicondi-
tional scheme)
Tφ ≡ φ,
where φ is a sentence of LPA.
2. UTB− is a theory axiomatized by the scheme (called Uniform Tarski
Biconditional scheme)
∀t¯
(
Tφ(t¯) ≡ φ(t¯◦)
)
,
where φ is a formula of LPA
3. CT− is finitely axiomatized by the following sentences
(a) ∀t, s
(
T (R(t, s)) ≡ R(t◦, s◦)
)
where R is = or ≤.
(b) ∀φ,ψ
(
T (φ⊗ ψ) ≡ T (φ)⊗ T (ψ)
)
, where ⊗ is ∧ or ∨.
(c) ∀φ
(
T (¬φ) ≡ ¬T (φ)
)
.
(d) ∀φ
(
T (Qxφ(x)) ≡ QtT (φ(t))
)
, where Q is ∃ or ∀.
4. TB, UTB, CT are the extensions of TB−, UTB−, CT− respectively
with full induction for the enriched language, i.e. TB = TB−∪Ind(T ),
UTB = UTB− ∪ Ind(T ), CT = CT− ∪ Ind(T ).
Convention 2.3. As suggested by the examples of weak theories of truth
in the Introduction, if Th is any theory extending PA then by TH we denote
the class of those models of PA which admits an extension to a model of T .
Let us state some standard results in model theory of PA which we will
make use of. Their proofs may be found in [10]. In all the following facts
we assume L to be any language extending LPA.
Fact 2.4 (Overspill lemma). Let φ(x) ∈ L be any formula. Let M be any
L-structure such that M |= Ind(φ). Suppose that for all n ∈ ω, M |= φ(n).
Then for some nonstandard c ∈M
M |= φ(c).
Fact 2.5 (Prime models). Let Th be any theory extending PA with full
induction scheme for the whole L. Then there exists the prime model K(Th)
of the theory Th. Moreover, all elements of K(Th) are definable, i.e. for
any c ∈ K(Th) there exists a formula φ(x) ∈ L such that
K(Th) |= φ(c) ∧ ∃! xφ(x).
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Let us define three important kinds of extensions of models of PA.
Definition 2.6. Let M ⊂ M ′ be any extension of models of PA. We call
such ans extension conservative (denoted ⊂cons) iff for any set X ⊂ M
′
definable inM ′ the set X ∩M is definable inM.We call it an end extension
(denoted ⊂end) iff any c ∈M
′ \M dominates M, i.e. c > b for all b ∈M and
M ′ \M 6= ∅. We call an extension cofinal (denoted ⊂cf ) iff for any c ∈ M
′
there exists b ∈ M such that c < b. If such an extension is additionally
elementary we denote it ≺cons,≺end,≺cf respectively.
It is an easy fact that any conservative extension is actually an end
extension. Less obviously we have the following theorem.
Fact 2.7 (MacDowell-Specker Theorem). Let Th be any theory extending
PA with full induction scheme for L and let M |= Th. Then there exists a
model M ≺M ′ |= Th such that M ′ is a conservative extension of M.
Definition 2.8. Let M be any L-structure. Let X ⊂ M. We call X a
(proper) class iff X is not definable in M (i.e. is not definable with param-
eters) but for any a ∈M the set {x ∈ X | x < a} is definable in M.
Fact 2.9 (Barwise-Schlipf-Ressayre). Let M be any recursively saturated
countable model of a recursive theory Th extending PA. Then for any finite
tuple a¯ ∈M , any recursive theory Th′ in a recursive language L′ extending
L ∪ {a¯} if Th′ + Th(M, a¯) is consistent, then M admits an expansion to a
model M ′ of Th′. The models M with the above property for an arbitrary
single sentence in place of recursive theory are called resplendent.
3 Easy or classical results
In this section we show how to prove almost all inclusions mentioned in the
introduction. Let us begin with some trivial observations:
Proposition 3.1. TB ⊇ UTB
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact, that TB is a subtheory of
UTB.
Fact 3.2. RS ⊇ UTB
Proof. Fix any model (M,T ) |= UTB and a recursive type p(x, a¯) over M
consisting of arithmetic formulae with parameters a1, . . . , an ∈M . Let φ(z)
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represent p(x, y1, . . . , yn) in PA. Since p(x, a1, . . . , an) is finitely satisfied in
M , for all k ∈ N
(M,T ) |= ∃c∀ψ < k
(
φ(ψ) −→ Tψ(c, a1, . . . , an)
)
.
Hence, by overspill, there is a nonstandard b ∈M and a c ∈M s.t.
M |= ∀ψ < b
(
φ(ψ) −→ Tψ(c, a1, . . . , an)
)
.
Which proves the thesis.
In proving the inclusion TB ⊃ RS, we will need the unpublished charac-
terization of TB, which has been found independently by Fredrik Engstro¨m
and Cezary Cies´lin´ski.
Proposition 3.3. M ∈ TB if and only if the set
ThLPA(M) = {φ ∈ N | φ ∈ SentLPA and M |= φ}
is coded in M .
Proof. Fix any model M |= TB.
(⇒) Observe that for all n ∈ N,
(M,T ) |= ∃x∀φ < n
(
φ ∈ x ≡ Tφ
)
and use overspill to find a code of the theory of M .
(⇐) Take T = {a ∈M | M |= a ∈ c}, where c is the code of ThLPA(M).
Corollary 3.4. TB ⊇ RS
Proof. Suppose that M is recursively saturated and consider the following
recursive type with a free variable x:
{φ ≡ φ ∈ x | φ ∈ SentLPA}.
Any element ofM realizing this type will be a code of the theory ofM . Hence
by Proposition 3.3 the model M can be extended to a model of TB.
Corollary 3.5 (Cies´lin´ski, Engstro¨m). TB ⊂ PA.
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Proof. Take any prime model K of a complete extension Th 6= Th(N) of
PA. Suppose that K admits an expansion to a model
(K,T ) |= TB.
But then by Proposition 3.3 there would be an element c ∈ K which codes
the theory Th. Since all elements of K are arithmetically definable without
parameters, the formula
x ∈ c
would then yield an arithmetical definition of truth for Th, contradicting
Tarski’s theorem.
Now we proceed to the construction of a model which codes its theory
and is not recursively saturated, in this way proving that the inclusion TB ⊇
RS is strict. It shows up that this is an easy consequence of MacDowell-
Specker theorem and the following lemma:
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that M ≺cons M
′ i.e. M ′ is an elementary, conser-
vative end extension of M . Then M ′ is not recursively saturated.
Proof. Let M , M ′ be as in the formulation of the lemma and suppose that
M ′ is recursively saturated. Pick c ∈ M ′ \M and let b ∈ M ′ realize the
following recursive type with the free variable y:
{∀x¯
(
φ(x¯) < c −→ (φ(x¯) ≡ (φ(x¯) ∈ y)
)
| φ(z¯) ∈ FormLPA}.
Consider the set
X = {a ∈M | M ′ |= a ∈ b}.
Since the extension M ≺ M ′ is conservative, X should be definable with
parameters from M. Then by definition of b the elementary diagram of M
would also be definable in M , which contradicts Tarski’s Theorem.
Theorem 3.7. TB ⊃ RS. Moreover, every model M has an elementary
extension to (M ′, T ) |= TB with M ′ not recursively saturated.
Proof. We prove the ”moreover” part which of course suffices. Let us fix
any M . Let c be a fresh constant. By compactness the following theory
ElDiag(M) ∪ {φ ∈ c | φ ∈ SentLPA ∧M |= φ}
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has a modelM ′, which is an elementary extension ofM . Note that c is a code
of the theory of ThLPA(M
′). Using MacDowell-Specker theorem (Theorem
2.7) we can find
M ′′ ≻cons M
′.
Since Th(M ′) = Th(M ′′), we see that c ∈ M ′′ is a code of a theory of M ′′.
By Proposition 3.3 M ′′ can be expanded to a model (M ′′, T ) |= TB. But by
lemma 3.6 it cannot be recursively saturated.
As a corollary we obtain a solution to a problem from [4].
Corollary 3.8 (Nicolai). UTB is not relatively interpretable in TB, i.e.
there is no formula φ(x) ∈ LPAT defining in every model (M,T ) |= TB a
subset S such that (M,S) |= UTB.
When we proved Theorem 3.7 we were not at all aware of the problem.
The above corollary has been formulated by Carlo Nicolai, who has also
brought Fujimoto’s paper to our attention.
Let us now return to the inclusion RS ⊇ UTB. It is easy to show that
for a counterexample to equality here we have to search among models with
uncountable cofinality. By a result of Smorynski–Stavi (see [15]) if T is an
extension of PA in a language L ⊇ LPA such that T contains induction
axioms for FormL, then T is preserved in cofinal extensions, i.e.
M |= T ∧M ≺cf N ⇒ N |= T.
Putting it together with the fact that countable and recursively saturated
models of PA are resplendent and that UTB is a conservative extension of PA
we see that every recursively saturated model of PA with countable cofinality
can be expanded to a model of UTB. In order to prove the existence of
recursively saturated models which do not expand to a model of UTB we
will profit from the fact that the interpretation of UTB-truth predicate, if
exists, is always a proper class.
Observation 3.9. If T ⊆M is such that (M,T ) ∈ UTB then T is a proper
class onM . Indeed, T is a class, because UTB contains induction axioms for
all formulae of enriched language and T is obviously undefinable by Tarski’s
theorem.
Recall that model M is rather classless if it contains no proper class.
Interestingly, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 3.10. There exists a recursively saturated and rather classless
model of PA.
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The existence of recursively saturated rather classless models of PA was
first demonstrated by Matt Kauffman in ZFC + ⋄ ([9]). The assumption
about existence of ⋄-sequence was later eliminated by Shelah (in [14]). In the
appendix we will present another argument for the existence of recursively
saturated rather classless models which was given in [15].
4 The Main Result
In the following part we will present the most technically involved part of
our result i.e.
Theorem 4.1. CT− ⊆ UTB, i.e. for any (M,T ) |= CT−, there exists T ′
such that (M,T ′) |= UTB.
We will precede the proof of the theorem with two lemmata. The first
of them states that in any nonstandard model (M,T ) of CT− we can find
nonstandard arithmetical truth predicates which, in a sense, satisfy UTB−,
i.e. there exists a formula
T ′(x) := Tρ(x),
where ρ(x) ∈ Form(M) such that for an arbitrary standard arithmetical
formula ψ and arbitrary terms t1, . . . , tn ∈ Term(M) we have
(M,T ) |= T ′ψ(t1, . . . , tn) ≡ ψ(t
◦
1, . . . , t
◦
n).
Let us say that in such a case the formula T ′ satisfies the Uniform Dis-
quotation Scheme. This lemma was actually already present in the paper
[17]. Let (χi) be an arbitrary primitive recursive enumeration of arithmetical
formulae. We will repeatedly refer to this enumeration.
Definition 4.2. By φ[ξ 7→ δ] we mean the result of formally substituting a
formula δ for every occurrence of the boolean subformula ξ in a formula φ.
Lemma 4.3. There exists a primitive recursive family of formulae (ρn) such
that any for any n ∈ ω and i ≤ n provably in CT− we have
∀t¯
(
Tρn(χi(t¯)) ≡ χi(t¯◦)
)
.
Moreover, for an arbitrary model (M,T ) |= CT−, for an arbitrary nonstan-
dard a and for an arbitrary i < ω (i.e. for an arbitrary standard i) we
have
∀t¯
(
Tρa(χi(t¯)) ≡ χi(t¯◦)
)
.
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In other words, the above lemma states that there exists a primitive
recursive family of arithmetical formulae which behave like partial truth
predicates for indefinitely growing finite sets of standard formulae (n-th
truth predicate works fine for first n formulae in our enumeration) such that
nonstandard truth predicates from this family behave well for all standard
formulae.
Proof. We will try to construct an analogue of simple arithmetical partial
truth predicates
τ(x) =
n∨
i=1
(x = φi) ∧ φi
but in such a way that they behave well in all models of CT− also for
nonstandard n. Let (χi)i<ω be an our fixed primitive recursive enumeration
of arithmetical formulae. Let
ξ2i(x) = ∀t¯
∧
j≤i
(
x = χj(t¯) −→ χj(t¯
◦)
)
ξ2i+1(x) = ∃t¯
∨
j≤i
(
x = χj(t¯)
)
.
Finally, let us define formulae which will play the role of the partial truth
predicate τ above.
ρ0 = ξ0
ρ2i+1 = ρ2i[ξ2i 7→ ξ2i ∧ ξ2i+1]
ρ2i+2 = ρ2i+1[ξ2i+1 7→ ξ2i+1 ∨ ξ2i+2].
Obviously these definitions may be formalised in PA. Note that a formula
ξi begins with a block of quantifiers. Thus although in principle a formula
ρj may have many subformulae of the form ξj , there is exactly one which is
its boolean subformula, namely the rightmost one. So, as i gets bigger, the
formulae ρi keep growing only to the right. Here are two simple properties
of so defined ρi’s for arbitrary i ∈ ω and any nonstandard a ∈M :
1. Tρa(x)→ Tρ2i(x).
2. Tρ2i+1(x)→ Tρa(x).
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To prove the first one assume that Tρa(x) holds. Note that
ρa(x) = ρ2i[ξ2i 7→ ξ2i ∧ γ](x)
for some nonstandard formula γ. Since ρ2i is a positive combination of the
formulae ξj (i.e. no negation symbol occurs in it as a boolean formula with
ξj ’s treated as propositional variables) a substitution of ξ2i ∧ γ for ξ2i yields
a formula stronger (no weaker) than ρ2i. As it is purely a matter of finite
boolean calculus, this can be proved in CT−. Proof of the second implication
is analogous.
We are now in a position to show that for an arbitrary nonstandard a the
formula Tρa(x) satisfies the uniform disquotation scheme i.e for an arbitrary
standard arithmetical φ and t1, . . . , tn ∈ Term(M) the following equivalence
holds:
Tρaφ(t¯) ≡ φ(t¯
◦).
Let us take any φ(t¯).We know that φ(t¯) = χi(t¯) for some i ∈ ω. Suppose
Tχi(t¯).
Then it is easy to see that
1. Tξ2i+1(χi(t¯))
2. ¬Tξ2j+1(χi(t¯)), for j < i
3. Tξ2j(χi(t¯)) for arbitrary j.
It is enough to show that Tρ2i+1(χi(t¯)). To this end we will prove by
external backwards induction that for any boolean subformula ψ of ρ2i+1
different from formulae of the form ξl the righthandside part of ψ is true
(note that since ξl’s begin with a block of quantifiers, they are the minimal
boolean subformulae of ρ2i+1). By assumption and points 1-3. above the
claim holds for the minimal subformula of ρ2i+1 different from ξl’s, i.e. for
ψ = ξ2i(χi(t¯)) ∧ ξ2i+1(χi(t¯)).
Now any righthandside of any subformula of ρ2i+1 is exactly of one of
the two following forms:
1. ξ2j ∧ γ
2. ξ2j+1 ∨ γ.
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But by induction hypothesis we can assume that γ is true. Now, since the
main connective in the formula ρ2i+1 is a conjunction of the form ξ0 ∧ γ, we
are able to prove in CT− that
Tρ2i+1(χi(t¯)).
By previous observation it follows that
Tρa(χi(t¯)).
The converse implication is handled in a similar fashion (but now using
Tρa(x) → Tρ2i(x)). Using similar arguments one can also show, that ρ2n
satisfies uniform disquotation scheme for formulae χ0, . . . , χn for arbitrary
n ∈ ω.
Before we state the next lemma, let us introduce some notation.
Definition 4.4. Let δ(x¯) be an arbitrary formula in the language LPAP i.e.
the language of arithmetic with a unary predicate P (x) added. Then for
an arbitrary formula φ with one free variable by δ[φ] we mean the result of
formally substituting the formula φ(xi) for any occurrence of P (xi) in the
formula δ (possibly preceded by some fixed renaming of bounded variables
in δ, so as to avoid clashes). If M |= δ[φ] we will say that φ satisfies a
property δ in the model M .
Let us quickly give an example of the above notions, which probably
could be more illuminating than a definition.
Example 4.5. Let δ(x, y) =
(
P (x) ≡ P (y)
)
. Then
δ[z = z] =
(
(x = x) ≡ (y = y)
)
.
Obviously both notions may be formalized in PA. We are now ready to
state the main lemma. This is the combinatorial core of our theorem. Es-
sentially it has been proved in [17], although for a special case. We reprove
it for the convenience of the Reader. Basically, the lemma states that the
existence of a truth predicate satisfying CT− allows us to define a predi-
cate satisfying UTB− and some additional definable properties shared by
arithmetical formulae.
Lemma 4.6 (Main Lemma). Let δ be an arbitrary formula in LPAP. Let
(M,T ) |= CT−. Suppose that for an arbitrary standard arithmetical formula
φ we have
(M,T ) |= δ[φ].
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Then there exists a formula T ′(x) in LPAT with parameters from M such
that
(M,T ) |= T ′ψ(t¯) ≡ ψ(t¯◦)
for an arbitrary standard arithmetical formula ψ and arbitrary terms t1, . . . , tn ∈
Term(M) and moreover
(M,T ) |= δ[T ′].
Before we prove the lemma, we will state separately its technical core.
To this end we need the following definition:
Definition 4.7. Let (M,T ) |= CT− be an arbitrary model. Recall that
Form(M) denotes the set of arithmetical formulae with at most one free
variable in the sense of the model M. We define the rank function r :
Form(M)→ ω ∪ {−∞,+∞} in the following way:
r(γ) =


−∞, if (M,T ) |= ¬Tδ[γ]
+∞, if (M,T ) |= Tδ[γ] and for all i ∈ ω
(M,T ) |= ∀t¯
(
Tγ(χi(t¯)) ≡ χi(t¯
◦)
)
n if (M,T ) |= Tδ[γ] and n+ 1 is the least number k ∈ ω
such that (M,T ) |= ¬∀t¯
(
Tγ(χk(t¯)) ≡ χk(t¯
◦)
)
.
Although the above definition may seem overly technical, it is indeed
very natural: the rank r measures in somewhat na¨ıve way, how close a given
formula γ come to satisfying Lemma 4.6. The next technical result (which
is essentially due to Smith, [17]) states that there exists a family of formulae
which behave extremely well with respect to the rank. Let < denote the
natural order on ω ∪ {±∞} such that −∞ < ω <∞ and < restricted to ω
is the natural ordering. We will show that there exists a primitive recursive
family of formulae (γi) such that on this family the rank is locally monotone
in i.
Lemma 4.8 (Rank Lemma). Let (M,T ) |= CT− be an arbitrary model and
let r be the rank function on this model. There exits a primitive recursive
family of formulae (γi) such that for all a ∈M if r(γa) < +∞, then
r(γa) < r(γa+1).
The idea of the above lemma is extremely simple: if we consider a natural
function measuring how close formulae come to satisfy the main lemma, it
turns out that for some carefully chosen family (γi) this function is locally
increasing as long, as it does not hit its maximum. Let us first prove the
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main lemma using Rank Lemma. Then we shall present the proof of Rank
Lemma, since it is admittedly more technical.
Proof of the Main Lemma assuming Rank Lemma. Let (M,T ) |= CT− be
an arbitrary nonstandard model. Let r, γi satisfy the assumptions of the
the Rank Lemma. Note that by definition of the rank function a formula
T ′(x) := Tφ(x) satisfies the main lemma exactly when r(φ) = +∞. We will
show that there exists a ∈M such that r(γa) = +∞.
Suppose otherwise. Fix an arbitrary nonstandard a ∈M . If there is no
b ∈M with r(b) = +∞, then by Rank Lemma we have:
r(a) > r(a− 1) > r(a− 2) > . . .
which forms an infinite descending chain in the well-order {−∞}∪ω. So by
contradiction there exists some a ∈M such that r(a) = +∞.
Before proving Rank Lemma it will be convenient to isolate one easy
technical (sub)lemma:
Lemma 4.9. Let (M,T ) |= CT−. Let φ(x) be a standard arithmetical
formula with one free variable and γ(x) an arbitrary formula from Form(M).
Suppose that
(M,T ) |= ∀t φ(t) ≡ Tγ(t) (1)
Then for an arbitrary standard formula δ(x1, . . . , xn) of LPAP we have
(M,T ) |= ∀t¯
(
δ[φ](t¯) ≡ Tδ[γ](t¯)
)
.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of δ. In the base step we use (1) (for
δ = P (x)) and the fact that CT− ⊢ UTB− (if δ is atomic LPA- formula). In
the induction step we use compositional axioms of CT−.
Proof of Rank Lemma. Let (M,T ) |= CT− be an arbitrary model. We have
to define a primitive recursive sequence of formulae (γi) satisfying the as-
sumptions of Rank Lemma. Recall that (χi) was an arbitrary primitive
recursive enumeration of all arithmetical formulae with at most one free
variable and that (ρi) was a primitive recursive sequence of arithmetical
partial truth predicates such that Tρa(x) satisfies the full uniform disquo-
tation scheme for any nonstandard a. Let us define the following sequence
of formulae
γ0(x) = (x = x)
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γi+1(x) = δ[γi] −→ αi,i(x)
αi,0(x) = ρ2i(x)
αi,j+1(x) =
(
∀t¯ γi(χi−(j+1)(t¯)) ≡ χi−(j+1)(t¯
◦)
)
∧ αi,j(x)
∨¬
(
∀t¯ γi(χi−(j+1)(t¯)) ≡ χi−(j+1)(t¯
◦)
)
∧ ρ2(i−(j+1))(x),
where j + 1 ≤ i. Obviously, this definition may be formalised in PA. We
will show that the sequence (γi) satisfies Rank Lemma. Take an arbitrary
a. Suppose that
r(γa) = −∞,
i.e.
(M,T ) |= ¬Tδ[γa].
Then by definition of γa+1 we have
(M,T ) |= ∀t Tγa+1(t).
Thus we obtain
(M,T ) |= ∀t
(
(t = t) ≡ Tγa+1(t)
)
and consequently (by Lemma 4.9 for φ(x) := (x = x) and the assumption
that every standard formula has the property δ)
(M,T ) |= Tδ[γa+1].
So r(γa+1) > −∞.
Now, we have to show the key part of the proof. Suppose that
r(γa) = n ∈ ω.
This means that for all i < n we have
(M,T ) |= ∀t¯ T γa(χi(t¯)) ≡ χi(t¯
◦),
but the equivalence does not hold for i = n. Now, the formulae αi,j are
designed precisely so that they measure when the formula Tγi fails to respect
the uniform disquotation scheme and replaces it with a formula of slightly
higher rank. In our case we have:
(M,T ) |= ¬T
(
∀t¯ γa(χa−(a−n)(t¯)) ≡ χa−(a−n)(t¯◦)
)
This means that for i = a and j + 1 = a− n we get by definition of αi,j:
(M,T ) |= T∀x
(
αa,a−n(x) ≡ ρ2n(x)
)
.
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But then the formula αa,a−n satisfies the uniform disquotation scheme for
χ0, . . . , χn and therefore by definition of αa,j we have the chain of equiva-
lences:
(M,T ) |= T∀x
((
αa,a−n(x) ≡ αa,a−n+1(x)
)
∧ . . . ∧
(
αa,a−1(x) ≡ αa,a(x)
))
.
So by definition of γa+1 it turns out that
(M,T ) |= T∀x
(
γa+1(x) ≡ ρ2n(x)
)
.
The formula ρ2n is standard and all standard formulae have the property δ.
So we have
(M,T ) |= Tδ[ρ2n].
This together with the fact that the formula ρ2n satisfies the uniform dis-
quotation scheme for χ0, . . . , χn means that r(γa+1) > r(γa).
We are almost ready to prove the main theorem. Unfortunately, we still
have to consider one very technical issue. In our proof we would like to use
at some point a property of generalised commutativity of compositional
truth predicates. I.e. for a compositional truth predicate T ′ we would like
to have the following equivalence for all standard formulae φ from LPAP
(i.e. formulae from the arithmetical language possibly enriched by one fresh
unary predicate P (v)) and (possibly nonstandard) arithmetical formulae η
T ′φ[η] ≡ φ[T ′η].
Unfortunately, this clean equivalence is not literally true. Namely, we have,
e.g.
T ′
(
∃x x = x
)
≡ ∃t T ′(t = t)
and the last sentence is simply not the same as
∃x T ′(x = x),
since x = x is a formulae with a free variable rather than a sentence. Thus
in order to use some form of the generalised compositionality we have to
make some technical amendments. There is a couple of ways this might be
done. We decide for the one which we believe makes our considerations most
perspicuous.
Definition 4.10. Let φ(x1, . . . , xn) be a standard formula from the language
LPAP. We say that φ is semirelational if it has no subformula of the form
P (t), where t is some term other than a first order variable.
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In what follows we will restrict our attention to semirelational formulae.
We can do this without loss of generality thanks to the next lemma.
Lemma 4.11 (Semirelational normal form). Let φ(x1, . . . , xn) be an ar-
bitrary formula from LPAP. Then there exists a semirelational formula
φ′(x1, . . . , xn) in the same language such that
|= ∀P ∀x1, . . . , xn
(
φ(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ φ
′(x1, . . . , xn)
)
.
The proof of the above lemma is completely straightforward. We replace
all the expressions of the form P (t) with ∃v (v = t∧P (v)) with v chosen so
that we can avoid clashes of variables.
Definition 4.12. Let (M,T ) be any model of CT− and let Φ be any subset
of Form(M). We say that a formula T ′(x) is extensional for formulae in Φ
if for all φ ∈ Φ we have
s¯◦ = t¯◦ →
(
T ′φ(s¯) ≡ T ′φ(t¯)
)
.
Extensionality is a very important property of a truth predicate which
may fail in the absence of induction. One of its consequences is the following
equivalence
∀φ ∀tTφ(t) ≡ ∀xTφ(x)
which does not trivialise if the language of PA is assumed to have function
symbols for addition and multiplication. One may show that the above
equivalence is independent from the axioms of CT−. That’s why we will
additionally demand this property from our partial truth predicates.
Lemma 4.13 (Generalised commutativity). Let(M,T ) be any model of
CT−. Suppose that T ′(x) satisfies compositional axioms and is extensional
for all formulae of the form φ[ξ], where φ is a standard semirelational for-
mula from the language LPAP and ξ ∈ Form(M) is an arbitrary arithmetical
formula, possibly nonstandard, with at most one free variable. Let us define
ξˆ(x) := T ′ξ(x).
Then the following equivalence holds
(M,T ) |= ∀x1, . . . , xn
(
T ′φ[ξ](x1, . . . , xn) ≡ φ[ξˆ](x1, . . . , xn)
)
.
Proof. We check the claim by induction on the complexity of φ.
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Now we are ready to prove our theorem. As a matter of fact, we shall
obtain slightly stronger result. The predicate T we are going to construct is
going to display an additional property that
(M,T ) |= UTB
is recursively saturated as a model of UTB.
Proof. Let (M,T ) |= CT− and let θ˜(y) be a formula ’P (x) is a compositional
extensional truth predicate for formulae < y’ i. e. a conjunction of the
following formulae:
1. ∀φ < y P (¬φ) ≡ ¬P (φ).
2. ∀φ,ψ < y P (φ⊙ ψ) ≡ P (φ) ⊙ P (ψ).
3. ∀φ < y P (Qxφ) ≡ Qt P (φ(t)),
4. ∀φ < y∀s, t
(
s◦ = t◦ → (Pφ(s) ≡ Pφ(t)
)
,
where ⊙ ∈ {∧,∨}, Q ∈ {∀,∃}. Let θ be a sentence ’θ˜ is inductive’ i.e.
∀x
(
θ˜(x)→ θ˜(x+ 1)
)
−→
(
θ˜(0)→ ∀xθ˜(x)
)
.
Let now (indk) be some recursive enumeration of the instances of the
induction scheme for semirelational formulae in the arithmetical language
with the additional predicate P (x). For an arbitrary formula φ with at most
one free variable let Indk(φ) be a conjunction of the first k instances of the
form indj [φ] with parentheses grouped to the right. The reader should not
be confused with the fact, that we used a predicate P to define Indk(φ). It
does not occur in our formula anymore.
Let ζ˜(x) be defined as
∀y < x P (Indy(ρy)).
So it is a formula saying ”P holds of the formula ’the formula ρy satisfies
first y instances of the induction scheme’ for all y smaller than x”. In other
words ”the formulae Indy(ρy) are true for all y < x”, since the intended
meaning of the predicate P (x) is the truth predicate. Let ζ be defined in an
analogous fashion to θ i.e.
ζ = ∀y
(
ζ˜(y)→ ζ˜(y + 1)
)
→
(
ζ˜(0)→ ∀y ζ˜(y)
)
.
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Let finally
δ = ζ ∧ θ.
Observe that every standard formula φ has the property δ, since δ[φ] is
simply an instance of the induction scheme. So by our lemma there is a
formula T ′(x) such that
(M,T ) |= δ[T ′]
and T ′ satisfies uniform disquotation scheme. Since it satisfies the scheme,
it is compositional for standard formulae, i.e. for all k ∈ ω
(M,T ) |= θ˜[T ′](k)
So, by overspill (T ′ satisfies θ!) we have
(M,T ) |= θ˜[T ′](c)
for some c > ω.
Now, since ρk for k ∈ ω are standard formulae, they satisfy full induction
scheme. In particular
(M,T ) |= ζ˜[T ′](k).
So applying overspill (T ′ satisfies ζ!) once more we get some nonstandard d
such that for all e < d we have
(M,T ) |= ζ˜[T ′](e).
Let us fix a nonstandard e < d, c which is much smaller than c, so that it
satisfies all the inequalities needed in the further part of the proof. Let us
list these inequalities right now, although it is not essential to understand
their role in advance. We also assume that we use a coding under which if φ
is a subformula of ψ, then the code of φ is smaller than the code of ψ. The
reader is warned that if we assume that e is nonstandard then actually all
the three points follow from the second one:
1. ρe < c.
2. Inde(ρe) < c.
3. For all standard formulae η we have η[ρe] < c.
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Let T ′′(x) be defined as T ′(ρe(x)). We claim that
(M,T ′′) |= UTB.
Since e is much smaller than c, we may assume that
ρe < c,
so that our predicate is compositional and we may show that it satisfies the
uniform disquotation scheme in exactly the same way as in the case of CT−.
It is enough to show that it satisfies the full induction scheme, that is we
have to show that
(M,T ) |= ∀x
(
φ[T ′′](x)→ φ[T ′′](Sx)
)
→
(
φ[T ′′](0)→ ∀x φ[T ′′](x)
)
(*)
for an arbitrary standard semirelational φ from LPAP. Note that for some
k ∈ ω the following equality holds:
indk[ρe] = ∀x
(
φ[ρe](x)→ φ[ρe](Sx)
)
→
(
φ[ρe](0)→ ∀x φ[ρe](x)
)
.
By assumption we have
(M,T ) |= T ′Inde(ρe).
Now, T ′ is compositional for formulae < c and we assumed that Inde(ρe) < c
and since k ∈ ω, the formula indk is located in the formula Indd on finite
syntactic depth. Thus we get:
(M,T ) |= T ′
(
∀x
(
φ[ρe](x)→ φ[ρe](Sx)
)
→
(
φ[ρe](0)→ ∀x φ[ρe](x)
))
.
By compositionality of T ′ and Lemma 4.13 for ξˆ = T ′′ this implies (*).
An inspection of the proof shows that the UTB predicate we have defined
is of the form
Tγa(ρb(x)),
for some nonstandard a, b. Thus by Theorem 3.1 of [17] the model we defined
is recursively saturated. Also by inspection of proof, we obtain the following
corollary:
Proposition 4.14. For any (M,T ) |= UTB, there exists T ′ ⊂M such that
(M,T ′) |= UTB is recursively saturated as a model of UTB.
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Proof. Note that the proof of our main theorem may be repeated with a
weaker assumption that (M,T ) is a model of partial compositional truth
predicate, i. e. truth predicate compositional for formulae ≤ c for some
nonstandard c ∈ M. But if (M,T ) |= UTB, then by overspill there ex-
ists some b ∈ M such that T ↾b is partial compositional, where T ↾b is a
restriction of the predicate T to formulae smaller than b.
There is also one corollary implicit in the proof of the theorem, that
seems to be worth stating explicitly.
Proposition 4.15. Let (M,T ) |= CT−. Then there exists a truth predicate
for M satisfying UTB which is definable in (M,T ) with parameters.
Note that by a standard overspill argument a model carries a UTB class
precisely when it carries a fully inductive partial compositional truth class.
As we have seen above, a model M |= PA with a partial compositional
truth class carries also a UTB class. Thus we may conclude that a model
M |= PA carries a partial compositional truth class if and only if it carries an
inductive partial compositional truth class, thus we may get full induction in
this setting somewhat for free. We did not check the details, but we believe,
that the results carry over to the satisfaction predicate setting. Thus a
corollary in the more classical language of satisfaction predicates would be
as follows: an arbitrary model M |= PA has a partial satisfaction class if
and only if it has a partial inductive satisfaction class.
Let us close this section with some remarks of the possible strategy of
proving that
CT− 6= UTB.
Models of UTB display a good deal of structural properties which they
possibly do not share with the models of CT−. Namely:
1. Every model in UTB has an elementary end-extension in UTB.
2. The class UTB is closed under cofinal extensions.
3. Every recursively saturated model of countable cofinality is in UTB.
We conjecture that for CT− all these properties fail, although we have
not managed to show it, nor have we any clue how to prove it.
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